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“Between the public interest and the free market: would the liberalisation 
of the legal profession bring benefits to the client—and to the market?” 
Dr Arianna Andreangeli 
Lecturer in Law 
Liverpool Law School, University of Liverpool 
 
1. Introduction. The legal profession between Brussels, Luxembourg and 
the Member States—a moving target? 
 
On 12 September 2007, the International and European Law Unit based in 
Liverpool Law School at the University of Liverpool hosted a conference on the 
topic of the impact of the application of the EC and national rules on the 
protection of competition on the regulation of legal services.  This theme has 
been at the forefront of the debate in the EU and in the Member States for a 
number of years.  In 2004, the Commission published a report on “Competition 
in Professional Services”, followed in 2005 by a second paper on the topic 
“Professional Services—scope for more reform”.1  The Commission efforts 
were prompted by the adoption at the Lisbon European Council in March 2000 
of an agenda of economic reform (the Lisbon Strategy) aimed at “making the 
EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world 
by 2010”.2   
         Among the goals pursued by that Strategy was the promotion of “better 
regulation” in professional services.  In the words of Commissioner Kroes: 
 
“Regulation should support European competitiveness rather than hinder 
it, and foster growth and jobs. This means regulation that is 
proportionate, grounded on clear evidence, and where the benefits of the 
rules clearly justify the cost. The better regulation agenda therefore rightly 
includes both improving new legislation and simplifying existing regulation 
too, as well as reviewing or abolishing obsolete rules.”3 
 
                                                 
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/sectors/professional_services/overview_en.html.  
Accessed on 12 March 2008. 
2 Communication from the European Commission, “Report on competition in professional services”, 
COM/2004/0083/final, executive summary, section 6.3. 
3 Commissioner Opening Speech to the EP JURI Committee on 29 November 2005, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2005_022_en.pdf. Accessed on 12 March 2008. 
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         Although the Commission recognised that in certain economic areas 
regulation may be justified, it called for the scrutiny of regulatory restrictions 
impinging upon the economic freedom of these professionals based on the 
principle of proportionality.4  According to the 2004 Report:  
 
“Rules must be objectively necessary to attain a clearly articulated and 
legitimate public interest objective and they must be the mechanism least 
restrictive of competition to achieve that objective. Such rules serve the 
interests of users and of the professionals alike.”5 
       
         Alongside action at EU level, individual Member States also investigated 
the issues arising from the implications of the competition rules for the 
regulatory structure governing the legal profession.  Among the documents 
published at domestic level, the Report of the Review of the regulatory 
framework for legal services in England and Wales, commissioned by the 
British Department for Constitutional Affairs and carried out by Sir David 
Clementi (hereinafter referred to also as the Clementi Report), and published in 
2004 provided an accurate and thought provoking snapshot of these issues in 
England and Wales.   
         The Clementi Report envisaged the establishment of a regulatory 
framework that could reconcile the promotion of “competition, innovation and 
the public and consumer interest in an efficient, effective and independent legal 
sector” with the public interest in the independence, accountability and 
transparency of the legal profession and for the purpose of protecting the 
sound administration of justice.6   It was argued that the regulation of the legal 
profession should ultimately ensure access to justice for all individuals through 
the establishment of a regulatory framework aiming to provide sound legal 
advice in a cost-effective and consumer friendly manner.7   
         The case law of the ECJ has also contributed substantially to the debate 
concerning the extent to which the EU competition rules should be applicable 
to the legal profession.  Decisions such as Arduino,8 Wouters,9 Mauri10 and 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Foreword, “Report of the Review of the regulatory framework for legal services in England and 
Wales”, Sir David Clementi, December 2004 (hereinafter referred to as Clementi Report) available at: 
http://www.legal-services-review.org.uk/content/report/foreword.htm, para. 2. Accessed on 12 March 
2008. 
7 Id., para. 10. 
8 Case C-35/99, Criminal proceedings against Manuele Arduino, [2002] ECR I-1529. 
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Fazari11 have raised significant questions on the objectives of regulation, on the 
assessment of the limits it places on the freedom to provide legal services 
enjoyed by each legal professional and the manner in which regulatory 
measures should be adopted.   
         These judgments have also provoked debate on more general issues 
concerning the interpretation of the Treaty competition rules.  The decision in 
Wouters raises the question of the extent to which “non-economic”, “public 
interest based” considerations should play a part in the competition scrutiny of 
the existing regulatory restrictions imposed on legal professionals.12  The 
preliminary rulings in the Arduino and Mauri cases, which confirmed that 
Member States remain entitled to exercise regulatory powers on the provision 
of legal services, raised issues in regard to the scope of applicability of Articles 
81 and 82 to these regulatory restrictions.13  The ECJ seemed to suggest that 
an “active supervision” requirement may have to be fulfilled to determine 
whether any regulatory restriction should come within the reach of the 
competition rules in cases in which domestic law provides for the involvement 
of national authorities in the adoption of, for instance, fee scales.14 
         The recent CFI judgment in AKZO Nobel also shed light to an allied but 
no less important issue concerning the provision of legal advice, namely the 
scope of legal professional privilege (hereinafter referred to also as LPP) in 
Community law.15  Although the Court declined to reformulate the conditions 
governing privilege so as to allow its protection to cover communications 
emanating from employed counsel, the judgment, which is now under appeal,16 
forcefully reaffirmed the principle of the “special status of lawyers” as 
intermediaries between the public and the courts and as professionals 
                                                                                                                                            
9 Case C-309/99, Wouters and others v Algemene Raad de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaaten, [2002] 
ECR I-1577. 
10 Case C-250/03, Mauri v Ministero della Giustizia and Commissione per gli esami di avvocato presso 
la Corte d’Appello di Milano, [2005] ECR I-1627. 
11 Joined cases C-94/04 and C-202/04, Cipolla v Fazari and others, [2006] ECR I-11621. 
12 Case C-309/99, Wouters and others v Algemene Raad de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaaten, [2002] 
ECR I-1577, para. 97-99. Cf.case T-112/99, Metropole Television (M6) SA and others v Commission, 
[2001] ECR II-2549, especially paras. 72, 74-77.  See also Commission Guidelines on the application 
of Article 81(3) EC Treaty, [2004] OJ C97, para. 10-11. 
13 See case C-35/99, Criminal proceedings against Manuele Arduino, [2002] ECR I-1529, paras. 37-
39; also, case C-250/03, Mauri v Ministero della Giustizia and Commissione per gli esami di avvocato 
presso la Corte d’Appello di Milano, [2005] ECR I-1627, paras. 31-34. 
14 See, inter alia, case C-250/03, Mauri, cit. (footnote 13), para. 35-37. 
15 Joined cases T-125/03 and 253/03, AKZO Nobel and Ackros Chemicals v Commission, judgment of 
17 September 2007, not yet reported. 
16 Case C-550/07, AKZO Nobel Ltd and Ackros Chemicals Ltd v Commission, appeal brought on 8 
December 2007, [2008] OJ C37/19. 
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responsible for the provision of legal advice in the interest of the sound 
administration of justice.17 
         The above remarks indicate that a general theme emerges from the 
debate, namely how the regulation of the legal profession can be balanced 
against the needs of competition in this market, in a manner which allows 
individuals to obtain reliable and good-quality legal advice for the purpose of 
exercising their right to access to justice. 18 
 
2. The goals and forms of regulation in the EU and in the Member States 
 
The above discussion suggests that paramount to the assessment of any 
framework for the regulation of the legal profession should be an examination 
of its goals and justifications.  In this respect, the arguments based on the need 
to correct the risk of “market failure” in the provision of legal and, more broadly, 
professional services are well established.  The need to correct the information 
asymmetry between the provider and the consumer, arising from their nature of 
“credence goods”, whose quality cannot be immediately and perceptibly 
assessed at the moment of acquisition, as well as the “negative external 
effects” potentially caused by the supply of “bad-quality” legal advice or by 
conflicts of interest are widely accepted as justifying the establishment of entry 
requirements, of fees and fees’ scales and limitations on the freedom to 
determine the business form through which to provide these services.19 
         However, it is essential that any regulatory structure assists rather than 
hinders the efficient provision of good-quality legal services.  It is in this context 
that the “competition scrutiny” should take place, to ensure that a strict 
relationship of proportionality between the restrictions imposed on the conduct 
of the service providers and the legitimate interests they pursue is satisfied.20  
In this specific respect, “public interest considerations”, namely the protection 
of confidentiality, the enforcement of appropriate standards of ethical integrity 
and of safeguards against conflicts of interests for the purpose of unfettered 
                                                 
17Joined cases T-125/03 and 253/03, AKZO Nobel and Ackros Chemicals v Commission, judgment of 
17 September 2007, not yet reported, especially paras. 77-79 
18 Inter alia, Foreword, Clementi Report, cit. (footnote 6), para. 10.  Accessed on 12 March 2008. 
19 See, inter alia, Clementi Report, cit. (footnote 17), paras. 7 and 11. 
20 E.g., Communication from the European Commission, “Report on competition in professional 
services”, COM/2004/0083/final, para. 49-51. 
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access to independent and properly qualified legal advice and the sound 
administration of justice play a key role.21 
         In addition, the enactment of the Modernisation Regulation, with its 
emphasis on the decentralised enforcement of competition law, has highlighted 
the importance of the role of national competition authorities in the process of 
“competition scrutiny” of the restrictions on business freedom imposed on 
lawyers in the public interest.  The 2003 reforms have in turn resulted in lively 
debate and painstaking review being initiated at national level.  For instance, in 
England and Wales, the Office of Fair Trading 2001 “Competition in 
professions”22 and the already mentioned 2004 Clementi Report paved the way 
for the adoption of the 2007 Legal Services Act.  The Irish Competition 
Authority also launched its own Report on the legal profession in 2006.23   
         The scrutiny currently taking place at national level should also be 
examined in the light of the principles affirmed by the ECJ in its recent case 
law, according to which any reform in the field of the regulation of the legal 
profession should take place first and foremost at national level, albeit within 
the framework of objectives established at EU level, including those laid down 
in the 2000 “Lisbon Strategy”.24   
         This position was also forcefully endorsed by the European Parliament.  
Its 2006 resolution emphasised that “any reform of the legal profession has far-
reaching consequences going beyond competition law into the field of freedom, 
security and justice”25 since it affects fundamental human rights such as that to 
access to justice and to a fair trial, which, under the EU constitutional 
framework, are left to the jurisdiction of the Member States.26  The European 
Parliament therefore called upon the Commission to exercise restraint in 
applying competition law to some of the restrictions on the economic freedom 
                                                 
21 Inter alia, case C-309/99, Wouters and others v Algemene Raad de Nederlandse Orde van 
Advocaaten, [2002] ECR I-1577, para. 98-99. 
22 OFT328 (March 2001), available at: 
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/professional_bodies/oft328.pdf.  Accessed on 12 March 
2008. 
23 Irish Competition Authority, “Competition in the liberal professions: solicitors and barristers”, 11 
December 2006, available at: 
http://www.tca.ie/NewsPublications/NewsReleases/NewsReleases.aspx?selected_item=181. Accessed 
on 12 March 2008. 
24 See e.g. case C-250/03, Mauri v Ministero della Giustizia and Commissione per gli esami di 
avvocato presso la Corte d’Appello di Milano, [2005] ECR I-1627, para. 44-45. 
25 European Parliament, Resolution on the legal professions and the general interest in the functioning 
of legal systems, 23 March 2006, P6_TA(2006)0108, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2006-
0108&language=EN, point B. Accessed on 12 March 2008. 
26 Id., point J; para. 5. 
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of legal professionals, such as those concerning the determination of fees and 
fee scales, which, by their nature, are inextricably linked to the right of each 
individual to seek access to justice.27   
         The implementation of the Modernisation reforms has also had wider 
implications for the provision of legal advice in individual cases.  Regulation No 
1/2003 strengthened the investigative powers enjoyed by the Commission and 
has laid down cooperation measures aimed at boosting the bringing of private 
antitrust claims before the national courts.28  In addition, as the litigation in the 
AKZO Nobel case shows, the abolition of the notification system and the direct 
applicability of the exception enshrined in Article 81(3) of the Treaty resulted in 
the increasing importance of self-assessment of prima facie anti-competitive 
practices which can only be possible through legal advice.29   
         In the light of these considerations, it is argued that the “consumer-
friendly” provision of good quality legal services in conditions of efficiency 
should be inspired by principles of genuine competition and by canons of 
ethical integrity, confidentiality and avoidance of conflicts of interest.30  
Accordingly, national legislatures and regulators together with the EU 
institutions should seek to establish a “level playing field” across the Common 
Market to achieve the goals of “better regulation” as far as possible uniformly, 
albeit in the respect of their reciprocal spheres of jurisdiction.31 
 
3. Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty and the legal profession: streams of 
debate 
 
This Special Issue of the European Business Law Review seeks to examine 
some of the aspects characterising the debate on the impact of the competition 
rules on the regulation of the legal profession and on the path toward the 
progressive “liberalisation” of the market for the supply of legal services, albeit 
in the light of the need to uphold the public interest to the sound administration 
of justice and to the unhindered access to the courts. 
                                                 
27 Id., para. 11-13. 
28 Council Regulation No 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down by 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2003] OJ L1/1, Preamble, Recitals 6-7, 23-26. 
29 See Joined cases T-125/03 and 253/03, AKZO Nobel and Ackros Chemicals v Commission, judgment 
of 17 September 2007, not yet reported, para. 13-14. 
30 European Parliament, Resolution on the legal professions and the general interest in the functioning 
of legal systems, 23 March 2006, P6_TA(2006)0108, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2006-
0108&language=EN, para. 9. Accessed on 12 March 2008. 
31 Id., para. 12-13. 
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         The contribution by Prof Alison Jones addresses the general issue of 
whether public interest considerations linked to the existence and functioning of 
regulatory regimes should play a part in the “competition scrutiny” of restriction 
on the economic freedom of undertakings and, if that is the case, how this 
assessment should be conducted.  Prof Jones examines the implications of 
judgments such as Wouters32 and Meca Medina33 for the manner in which this 
appraisal should be carried out and compares it with other decisions34 and with 
the Commission Guidelines on the interpretation of Article 81 (3) of the EC 
Treaty.35  She argues that the current position adopted by the ECJ, which is 
becoming increasingly similar to the ‘rule of reason’ approach adopted by the 
US Courts in the application of Section 1 of the Sherman Act36 which, if on the 
one hand is likely to ensure that “public interest considerations” are taken into 
proper account in the competition scrutiny of regulatory restrictions, on the 
other hand makes the position adopted by the Commission difficult to reconcile 
with the views adopted by the ECJ.37 
         The paper provided by Prof Frank Stephen considers the possible 
justifications for the regulation of the provision of legal services and analyses 
the main reasons for the failure of the market in this area, namely the 
asymmetry of information between suppliers and consumers and the concept 
of negative externalities.  The contribution then moves on to assess the 
implications in England and Wales of the 2007 Legal Services Act and argues 
that as a result of its enactment, the structure of the market for the supply of 
legal services may already be evolving towards a degree of regulatory 
competition.  Prof Stephen suggests that overall, the outcome of the 2007 
reforms is likely to be the emergence of “competitive regulation based on legal 
service market rather than the individual professional and subject to a minimum 
standard” established by the oversight regulating authority.38 
         Prof John Peysner’s essay provides the reader with an assessment of the 
impact of past and present regulatory approaches on the right of individuals to 
                                                 
32 Case C-309/99, Wouters and others v Algemene Raad de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaaten, [2002] 
ECR I-1577.  
33 Case C-519/04 P, Meca Medina and Majcen v Commission, [2006] ECR I-6991. 
34 Case T-112/99, Metropole SA and others v Commission, [2001] ECR II-2459. 
35 Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) EC Treaty, [2004] OJ C101/97.  For 
commentary, see JONES, “Analysis of agreements under US and EC antitrust law: convergence or 
divergence?”, (2006) 51(4) Antitrust Bulletin 691. 
36 See e.g. Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v US, 221 US 1 (1911). 
37 Inter alia, JONES, cit. (footnote 35), at p. 805-806. 
38 STEPHEN, “Regulation of the legal professions or regulation of markets for legal services: potential 
implications of the Legal Services Act 2007”, (2008) EBLRev, this issue, infra, p. **. 
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seek access to a court in a specific area of litigation, namely personal injury 
work.  It examines the implications of the UK Government decision no longer to 
finance these claims by means of legal aid funds and to move to a system base 
on contingency fee agreements for the quality and accessibility of legal 
services.39   
         Thereafter, the paper analyses the disciplinary issues and the questions 
for access to justice arising from the practice of charging “referral fees”.  It 
argues that the current position, according to which charging these fees is 
prohibited, may not be consistent with the needs of the provision of legal 
services in an area where legal aid is no longer available and, ultimately, may 
not ensure that individual litigants obtain redress of their rights away from 
conflicts of interest with their legal advisers. 
         The previous section illustrated how the agenda for the reform of 
regulation of the market for the provision of legal service is now being shaped 
not only at EU but also at national level.  The contribution provided by Prof 
Dermot Cahill represents a critical account of the debate taking place in Ireland 
on the issue partly as a result of the publication by the Irish Competition 
Authority of the 2006 Report into the Legal Profession.40   
         The paper describes the current state of affairs concerning the regulation 
of barristers and solicitor in this jurisdiction and analyses the proposals made 
by the Irish competition agency for future reform.  Prof Cahill argues, on the 
one hand, that some of the Recommendations should be welcomed as capable 
of increasing openness and transparency in the structure of the legal 
profession as well as improving the efficiency in the provision of legal services.            
         On the other hand, however, he points to major flaws in the approach 
adopted by the NCA in its assessment of both the current state and the future 
perspectives characterising the Irish Legal Profession, such as the lack of an 
underlying economic analysis of the issues arising from the impact of the rules 
on competition on the regulation of the legal profession.  Overall, the essay 
highlights the partial inability of the Report to tackle the principal question 
raised by the inquiry, i.e. whether more liberalisation in the supply of legal 
services can actually benefit the consumer by means of better quality and more 
widely available legal advice. 
                                                 
39 See Schedule 2, Legal Services Act 1999. 
40 Irish Competition Authority, Final Report: Competition in Professional Services—Solicitors and 
Barristers, 11 December 2006, available at: 
http://www.tca.ie/NewsPublications/NewsReleases/NewsReleases.aspx?selected_item=181. Accessed 
12 March 2008. 
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         Finally, the case note on the recent AKZO Nobel and Ackros Chemicals v 
Commission judgment,41 provides an analysis of the current state of affairs as 
regards the scope and the conditions governing legal professional privilege in 
EC law.  It is argued that, although the CFI disappointed the expectation that 
the existing test governing privilege would be reformulated with a view to 
covering also communications emanating from employed legal advisers,42 its 
judgment is nonetheless significant since it subjects the Commission to a 
number of “checks and balances” in the exercise of its powers to grant or 
withhold confidential treatment to evidence containing legal advice.43   
         Accordingly, the case note suggests that by forcefully restating the 
concept of “professional autonomy” of lawyers for the purpose of privilege 
primarily as “economic independence” of the client and by laying down an ad 
hoc procedure for dealing with these claims, the CFI reiterated the central 
status of lawyers for the sound administration of justice through the provision of 
independent and reliable legal advice to those in need of it.44 
 
4. “Between the public interest and the free market”: where now for the 
liberalisation of the market for legal services? 
 
The debate taking place at European and at national level, which has been 
reflected by the contributions to this issue highlights an underlying topic, 
namely the interplay between two competing, yet not irreconcilable, interests.  
On the one hand, there are the needs of the market: legal services should be 
provided in an efficient, consumer friendly manner and constitute “value for 
money”, in harmony with the principles at the basis of the “better regulation” 
agenda.  On the other hand, there is the public interest, namely the protection 
of the sound administration of justice and the full availability of sound and 
affordable legal advice. 
           Therefore, it is the task of regulation to strike a fair balance between 
these competing interests, in the light of clearly spelled goals.  In this respect, 
the 2004 Clementi Report called for the creation of a framework aimed at the 
objectives of enhancing confidence in the judicial system, upholding the rule of 
                                                 
41 Joined cases T-125/03 and 253/03, AKZO Nobel Ltd and Ackros Chemicals Ltd v Commission, 
judgment of 17 September 2007, not yet reported. 
42 See Case 155/79, AM & S Europe Limited v Commission of the European Communities, [1982] ECR 
1575, para. 20-21. 
43 Joined cases T-125/03 and 253/03, AKZO Nobel Ltd and Ackros Chemicals Ltd v Commission, 
judgment of 17 September 2007, not yet reported, paras. 45-48. 
44 Id., para. 167-168. 
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law, ensuring full access to justice and protecting the interest of the 
client/consumer.45  At the same time, the Commission Report, inspired by the 
Lisbon Agenda, argued that any limitation on the economic freedom of legal 
professionals should be outweighed by its benefits.46 
         It is therefore necessary to ensure that any restriction on the economic 
freedom of legal professionals is strictly proportionate to the legitimate aims it 
pursues.  And this is the function of competition scrutiny, as an essential part of 
the regulatory process seeking to reconcile the competing requirements of 
confidence in the legal system and those of the efficient delivery of legal 
services.47  In this context, the call for more competition in the market for the 
provision of legal services, especially through the introduction of “alternative 
business structures” and the liberalisation of the determination of fees and fees’ 
scales emerges clearly from the Commission’s statements48 and is also 
reflected in the reforms taking place in some of the Member States.49   
         However, the impact of the application of the competition rules on the 
regulation of legal profession has raised a number of general problems:  as the 
Wouters judgment50 has amply demonstrated, the consideration of “non-
economic”, “public interest” concerns in the context of the competition scrutiny 
may have wider implications for the structure of Article 81 of the EC Treaty and 
has raised questions on the suitability of this rule, in the way in which it is 
currently interpreted by the Commission, to fulfil this task.51  Also, the 
circumstance that, as the European Parliament forcefully indicated, any reform 
to the regulatory structures governing the legal profession should take place 
first and foremost at national level could create potential problems for the 
uniform application of the Community competition rules and overall for the 
realisation of a “level playing field” in this area.52 
         It is therefore clear that paramount to the complex balancing exercise 
characterising the competition scrutiny should be the protection of the 
                                                 
45 Clementi Report, cit. (footnote 6), para. 7. 
46 Communication from the European Commission, “Report on competition in professional services”, 
COM/2004/0083/final, executive summary, section 6.3. 
47 Ibid. 
48 See e.g. id., para. 22-23, 31-34. 
49 See Clementi Report, cit. (footnote 6), para. 103-104. 
50 Case C-309/99, Wouters and others v Algemene Raad de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaaten, [2002] 
ECR I-1577.  
51 See, e.g., JONES, cit. (footnote 35), p. 805-806. 
52 European Parliament, Resolution on the legal professions and the general interest in the functioning 
of legal systems, 23 March 2006, P6_TA(2006)0108, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2006-
0108&language=EN, paras. 9, 12-13. Accessed on 12 March 2008. 
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client/consumer.  It is acknowledged that the interests of the client are best 
served by the absence of unjustified restrictions on competition as well as by 
the application of appropriate education and ethical integrity standards.  
However, it is also important not to lose sight of the special role that lawyers 
play in a democratic society, for the purpose of providing sound and widely 
available legal advice.   
         On this point, the European Court of Human Rights stated in its Casado 
Coca judgment that the primary function of the legal profession is to serve “the 
public interest through the furtherance of free, adequate legal assistance 
combined with public supervision of the practice of the profession and of 
compliance with professional ethics.”53  Furtherance of these objectives is 
regarded by the Court as inextricably linked to the “central position” of the legal 
profession “in the administration of justice as intermediaries between the public 
and the courts.”54  Accordingly, it is argued that this “special status” not only 
constitutes a fundamental justification for regulation as a legitimate means to 
safeguard these objectives.  It also provides perhaps the ultimate benchmark 
against which the efforts for increased competition in this market, which is so 
specific, should be assessed.55 
         Against this background, it is clear that the “consumer”, namely the client, 
seeking legal advice and assistance should constitute the focus of any 
regulatory effort, as a result of which his or her welfare should be maximised 
through the supply of effective, prompt and well qualified legal advice.  In this 
context, preserving the economic freedom of legal services providers is 
fundamental as it benefits efficiency and innovation.  Nonetheless, its 
protection and promotion must at all times be reconciled with essential 
principles such as the sound administration of justice and the right to access to 
a court.56   
         A democratic society clearly requires the provision of good quality, good 
value for money legal services in conditions of competition—and these are the 
needs of the market being met.  However, and perhaps most importantly, it 
demands that the “best interest of the client” be kept at the forefront of any 
effort to improve the provision of legal advice—and this requirement stems 
directly from that public interest which justifies regulation.  It is therefore the 
                                                 
53 Appl. No 15450/89, Casado Coca v Spain, judgment of 24 February 1994, Ser. A-285A, para. 54. 
54 Id., para. 54-55. 
55 See also See Clementi Report, cit. (footnote 6), para. 11. 
56 See e.g., mutatis mutandis, Appl. No 31611/96, Nikula v Finland, [2004] 38 EHRR 45, para. 45. 
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task of judges, regulators and of the legislature to ensure that the objectives of 
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